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 1. Introduction 
In this paper, we empirically examine whether and how managers engage in various strategies of 
earnings management in response to different degrees of market overvaluation. This investigation is 
motivated by the agency cost theory of overvalued equity proposed by Jensen (2005), which predicts 
that managers of overvalued firms exercise income-increasing earnings management opportunistically 
to maintain the overvaluation of their firms. Jensen’s opportunistic hypothesis is supported by evidence 
showing that overvalued firms significantly inflate earnings through both accruals-based earnings 
management (AEM hereafter) and real earnings management (REM hereafter) (Chi and Gupta, 2009; 
Houmes and Skantz, 2010; Badertscher, 2011).  
Jensen (2005) emphasizes that the motive for earnings management is only applicable to 
substantially overvalued firms. However, most of the existing literature testing Jensen’s hypothesis does 
not directly test the behaviour of substantially overvalued firms. Instead, the extant empirical literature 
focuses on a group of firms whose market valuation is higher than the rest of the sample, which is likely 
to comprise some substantially overvalued (SOV hereafter) firms together with many relatively 
overvalued (ROV hereafter) firms. The managers of both SOV and ROV firms have incentives to 
sustain the overvaluation because the wealth of the managers is typically tied to stock prices, for 
example, through performance-based bonuses or stock options. However, the behaviour of managers of 
SOV and ROV firms is likely to differ since the strength of their incentives depends on the degree of the 
firm’s overvaluation. Jensen (2005) explains that managers of SOV firms have no option but to manage 
earnings since they could not deliver the performance expected by the market. The only alternative to 
managing earnings would be to disclose the overvaluation and allow the market to correct the 
mispricing, but as Jensen (2005, p.10) argues, “there has simply been no listening in boards for this 
problem”.  
In contrast, ROV firms might have other options than managing earnings. If the market 
overvaluation is modest, managers may believe that they will be able to deliver the performance 
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expected by the market and, thus, have no need to manage earnings. It is also likely that managers of 
ROV firms could take advantage of market sentiments to further increase the stock price of their firms. 
Polk and Sapienza (2009) explain that overvaluation might incentivise firms to increase investment 
since the increased investment ‘caters’ to the sentiment of the market, delivers a prospect of greater 
growth and justifies the high market price. Increasing investment can lead to a better long-term outcome 
for shareholders than managing earnings and thus supports the high stock price. However, increasing 
investment is not a viable option for managers of SOV firms because increasing investment would 
reduce short-term earnings. This reduction in earnings would further increase the already wide gap 
between reported and expected performance and cause a downward pressure on share prices. 
Therefore, we infer that the existing evidence of income-increasing earnings management is 
mainly driven by the behaviour of SOV firms and argue that distinguishing between SOV and ROV 
firms would generate more insights into the issue of whether and how managers of overvalued firms 
manage earnings. Thus, we hypothesize that only managers of SOV firms inflate earnings, while 
managers of ROV firms refrain from managing earnings and follow other strategies to sustain 
overvaluation. 
Using a sample of UK listed firms over the period from 1995 to 2012, we investigate whether 
managers of SOV and ROV firms engaged in AEM and REM. We estimate discretionary accruals using 
the modified Jones (1991) model to proxy for AEM and abnormal discretionary expenses following 
Roychowdhury (2006) to proxy for REM. We follow Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) to estimate the firm’s 
intrinsic value and use the price-to-value ratio as a proxy for the degree of mispricing. In each industry-
year, we sort firms by the price-to-value ratio. We then define SOV firms as those with the price-to-
value ratio higher than or equal to the corresponding 95th percentile and ROV firms as those with the 
price-to-value ratio higher than or equal to the 80th percentile but smaller than the 95th percentile. 
Although the cut-off point separating SOV form ROV firms is unavoidably arbitrary, it is reasonable to 
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differentiate the two groups in terms of the degree of overvaluation, with SOV firms having a 
significantly higher price-to-value ratio than ROV firms1. 
The main findings present evidence consistent with managers of SOV firms inflating earnings, 
using both AEM and REM, in the year after the substantial overvaluation is identified. In contrast, ROV 
firms are found to have higher discretionary expenses than SOV firms and they do not engage in AEM. 
We argue that, rather than an attempt to manage earnings, the higher discretionary expenses exhibited 
by ROV firms are consistent with firms increasing discretionary expenses (e.g., research and 
development, and advertising) to deliver growth and hence satisfy the high market expectations. To shed 
further light on our documented evidence of higher discretionary expenses of ROV firms, we also 
examine the pattern of abnormal discretionary expenses of SOV and ROV firms at different stages of 
the business life cycle. Firms in the expanding phase typically have more growth opportunities and their 
operating efficiency is not yet maximized (Dickinson, 2011). Hence, being in the expanding phase often 
leads firms to make higher investments in discretionary operating and capital expenditure. Although 
higher discretionary expenses result in lower reported earnings, the market usually interprets higher 
expenditure as good news for firms in the expanding phase, as suggested by Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
Mature and stagnant firms, on the contrary, are generally not involved in activities that lead to high 
discretionary expenses, as the market would usually react negatively to such behaviour. Hence, if a 
mature or stagnant firm increases discretionary expenses, it would normally affect stock price 
negatively.  
Therefore, we argue that if an ROV firm is in the expanding stage of its life cycle, its managers 
will most likely respond to market overvaluation by increasing discretionary expenses, but high 
discretionary expenses would not be observed for mature and stagnant ROV firms. In the case of SOV 
firms, we predict that they would not increase discretionary expenses regardless of where they are in the 
business cycle, because otherwise their reported earnings will be too low compared to market 
expectations and this would lead to a considerable fall in share price. We obtain evidence in line with 
1 In section 4.4, we also use other cut-off points and show that the main findings do not qualitatively change. 
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our hypotheses, showing that abnormally high discretionary expenses are mainly observed in ROV 
firms that are in the expanding phase of their life cycle. Therefore, the evidence supports the explanation 
that the higher than normal discretionary expenses reported by ROV firms is not caused by a deliberate 
attempt to engage in REM. Overall, the evidence supports the view that, while managers of SOV firms 
inflate earnings using both AEM and REM, managers of ROV firms do not manage earnings.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, by making the distinction between SOV and 
ROV firms, the analysis in the paper enhances our understanding of whether and how overvaluation 
triggers earnings management. Compared to Badertscher (2011), for example, our focus is on the degree 
of overvaluation, while Badertscher mainly asks if the duration of the overvaluation drives the earnings 
management behaviour of managers in overvalued firms. Through our analysis, we are able to show that 
the behaviour of managers of SOV firms mainly drives the evidence documented by earlier studies that 
overvalued firms inflate earnings to sustain overvaluation (Chi and Gupta, 2009; Houmes and Skantz, 
2010; Badertscher, 2011). Second, we provide evidence on how overvalued firms choose between AEM 
and REM to respond to overvaluation. Managers of SOV firms are found to engage in both income-
inflating AEM and value-destroying REM simultaneously. This evidence is new and contributes to the 
on-going debate on how managers choose between AEM and REM. While the existing literature 
generally suggests that AEM and REM are used as substitutes (Zang, 2012; Badertscher, 2011), our 
evidence shows that, if a firm is substantially overvalued, both AEM and REM are used simultaneously 
to cover up the substantial overvaluation. In contrast, managers of ROV firms do not engage in AEM 
and appear to refrain from REM, depending on the firm’s life cycle phase.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature before the 
hypotheses are determined and developed. Section 3 describes the data and main methodologies used to 
test the hypotheses. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, while section 5 concludes. 
2. Related literature, motivation and hypotheses 
Jensen (2005) analyses the incentives and pressures faced by managers of overvalued firms that 
could lead to value-destroying earnings management. Managers, whose wealth is often tied to the firm’s 
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performance, have an incentive to maximize the performance-linked component of their compensation, 
such as bonuses and stock options. In addition, existing evidence suggests that neglecting the market’s 
expectations results in substantial adverse effects on managers’ compensation (Matsunaga and Park, 
2001) and significantly large negative abnormal returns (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Because overvalued 
firms are unable to deliver a performance that meets the market’s expectations, Jensen (2005) 
conjectures that managers of overvalued firms would engage in earnings management to inflate 
earnings.  
Following Jensen’s (2005) prediction, prior studies have empirically investigated how managers 
of overpriced firms manage earnings. Chi and Gupta (2009) measure firm-specific and industry-level 
valuation errors using a valuation model developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). They find evidence 
that valuation errors are positively related to discretionary accruals in the year following the overpricing 
of the firm’s equity. Houmes and Skantz (2010) present evidence that managers of overvalued firms, 
identified as those with a high prior year price-to-earnings ratio and/or high prior year abnormal returns, 
use discretionary accruals to manage earnings upwards in the year following the firm’s overvaluation. 
Badertscher (2011), following Frankel and Lee (1998), estimates the firms’ intrinsic value with a 
valuation model based on the residual income approach (Edwards and Bell, 1966; Ohlson, 1995) and 
uses the price-to-value ratio to identify overvaluation. Badertscher (2011) finds that the longer the 
period of overvaluation, the more likely it is that managers will engage in earnings management 
behaviour. Overvaluation is also shown to trigger different earnings management techniques depending 
on its duration. AEM is used extensively in the early years of overvaluation, but after three years REM 
becomes the more likely method. In addition, Badertscher (2011) also finds that the longer a firm is 
overvalued, the more likely it is that the managers will engage in earnings management that later 
requires restatements. 
Although the established evidence seems consistent with the agency cost theory of overvalued 
equity proposed by Jensen (2005), there are aspects of Jensen’s hypothesis that remain unexplored. One 
of the limitations of the extant literature relates to the identification of overpriced firms. Jensen (2005) 
emphasizes that his explanation is only applicable to substantially overvalued firms. Nevertheless, most 
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of the existing literature testing Jensen’s hypothesis does not directly test the behaviour of such 
substantially overvalued firms. For example, Badertscher (2011) defines overvalued firms as all firms 
that belong to the top quintile ranked by the price-to-value ratio. He finds that managers of overvalued 
firms defined in this way manage earnings to sustain the overvaluation. However, it is possible that 
firms classified as overvalued using the above approach may not all be substantially overvalued in 
Jensen’s (2005) terms. Jensen (2005, p.10) believes that managers of substantially overvalued firms 
often “perceive it is impossible for them to meet the performance requirements to justify the current 
price of their equity” and “they knew with great certainty that their firm was overvalued”. In reality, 
Badertscher’s (2011) approach captures a wide group of firms experiencing different degrees of 
overvaluation. It is an interesting question whether we will observe different managers’ behaviour in 
this group, depending on the degree of the equity’s overvaluation. This is a common issue among 
studies testing Jensen’s hypothesis (Chi and Gupta, 2009; Houmes and Skantz, 2010).  
In documenting that the duration of overvaluation significantly drives earnings management, 
Badertscher (2011) also makes an important contribution by providing evidence consistent with 
managers of overvalued firms using AEM and REM as substitutes. In particular, he finds that managers 
tend to use AEM in the first three years of overvaluation, followed by REM after overvaluation has 
persisted for three years. It is a well-established finding in the empirical literature that managers of 
overvalued firms tend to engage in AEM in the year following overvaluation (Chi and Gupta, 2009; 
Houmes and Skantz, 2010). However, Badertscher’s (2011) finding that managers of overvalued firms 
do not engage in REM in the year following overvaluation calls for further scrutiny. In particular, it is 
questionable whether the managers of a substantially overvalued firm would be able to choose the less 
costly AEM over the more value-destroying REM, since they would need a large inflation of earnings to 
successfully maintain the overvaluation. Therefore, we investigate whether AEM and REM are only 
substitutes for ROV firms and not for SOV firms. We hypothesize that, if a firm is substantially 
overvalued, both AEM and REM are used simultaneously to inflate earnings in line with the market’s 
expectations.  
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The above arguments motivate us to make a distinction between SOV and ROV firms and to 
empirically investigate the extent to which the degree of overvaluation would affect the managers’ 
engagement in different earnings management strategies. Given the heavy cost of not fulfilling the 
market’s expectations (Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Skinner and Sloan, 2002), we expect that managers 
of both SOV and ROV firms would take actions to sustain market mispricing. Since SOV firms are 
unlikely to be able to meet the market’s expectations (Jensen, 2005), we predict that managers of SOV 
firms would need to inflate earnings artificially. While AEM is less costly than REM, it is not always 
possible for managers of SOV firms to achieve the desired level of earnings by using only AEM 
because of the scrutiny of the Board of Directors and external auditors, as well as the reversing nature of 
accruals. In contrast, REM is more defensible and could be deployed when room for using AEM is 
restricted. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, unlike AEM, which only involves manipulating 
figures in the books, REM is economically costly and thus it destroys value. Although previous 
evidence suggests that AEM and REM are used as substitutes, Badertscher (2011) finds that REM is 
only used once AEM has been extensively used and further engagement in AEM may be difficult to 
conceal. Managers of SOV firms are under pressure to avoid the market detecting the substantial gap 
between the market’s high expectations and the performance the firms could deliver. In this context, 
they are likely to employ all available earnings management tools. Therefore, we predict that managers 
of SOV firms would inflate earnings using both AEM and REM. We argue that, if managers of SOV 
firms were to use only AEM to mask the substantial overvaluation, the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals would become large enough to attract scrutiny from the Board and auditors. Thus, our first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Substantially overvalued (SOV) firms engage in income-increasing accruals-based (AEM) 
and real (REM) earnings management. 
We argue that managers of ROV firms would behave differently, because it is less likely for 
managers of ROV firms to think that their firms are overvalued to the point of being unable to deliver in 
line with the market’s expectations. Since managing earnings to sustain overvaluation is costly for both 
the firms and their managers (Jensen, 2005; Badertscher, 2011), unless managers firmly believe that 
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they will not be able to deliver the performance expected by the market, it is unlikely that they would 
resort to artificially inflating earnings. In addition, using earnings management to sustain overvaluation 
tends to require increasingly more earnings management in subsequent periods due to the reversing 
nature of accruals. Thus, we predict that managers of ROV firms avoid engaging in earnings 
management as follows:  
H2: Relatively overvalued (ROV) firms do not engage in income-increasing accruals-based 
(AEM) and real (REM) earnings management. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.    Sample selection 
We use a sample of UK ordinary stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period 
from 1995 to 2012. All data were downloaded from Datastream, except for external auditors, which 
were sourced from Bloomberg. Data from Bloomberg were merged with Datastream via the 
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). To avoid survivorship bias, both live and dead 
stocks were selected. Financial and utility firms were excluded. Firms that had more than one type of 
ordinary share were also excluded to avoid problems with apportioning firm-level earnings to each type 
of share. The final sample was derived after applying the following additional restrictions. First, stocks 
whose market-to-book ratios were negative were excluded to avoid problems associated with 
interpreting negative book values in terms of market valuation. Second, to avoid tiny stocks that could 
potentially inflate the scaled variables, stocks with initial total assets of less than £1 million were also 
dropped. Finally, we exclude observations with missing data for any of the variables used in the main 
analysis. The final sample comprises 11,851 firm-year observations. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
3.2.     Proxies for earnings management 
We use discretionary accruals (Ab_AC) as a proxy for AEM. Ab_AC is estimated as the signed 
residual of the regression specified using the cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones model, in 
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which total accruals are calculated using the cash flow approach (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995)2. To 
empirically proxy for REM, we estimate abnormal discretionary expenses following Roychowdhury 
(2006)3. All regressions are run within each industry-year with at least six observations using 
Datastream’s level-six industry classifications4. Roychowdhury’s (2006) measure of abnormal 
discretionary expense is multiplied by -1 to derive the measure of abnormal discretionary expense 
(Ab_DEX) so that a positive value indicates income-increasing earnings management by cutting 
discretionary expenses.  
3.3.     Identification of substantially overvalued (SOV) and relatively overvalued (ROV) firms  
Chi and Gupta (2009) adopt the valuation model developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) to 
estimate the firms’ intrinsic value. They also find evidence that trading strategies that take long 
positions in under-priced stocks and short positions in over-priced stocks can generate significant 
abnormal returns for up to three years after portfolio formation. Such evidence confirms that the 
valuation errors estimated using the Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) approach can indeed capture some 
market mispricing. Badertscher (2011) also employs the Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) approach in a 
robustness test. 
We follow Chi and Gupta (2009) and Badertscher (2011) in employing the Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s 
(2005) approach to estimate the firms’ intrinsic value. In each year, firms in the same level-six industry 
2 Despite recent criticisms that accrual models, such as the one used in this paper, might be misspecified (Ball, 
2013; Owens et al., 2017), the Modified Jones model is still one of the most popularly used models to empirically 
proxy for earnings management. To mitigate the concerns about model misspecification, we replicate the main 
analysis using some variations of the modified-Jones model, including the following: (i) suppressing the 
intercept; (ii) using the balance sheet approach to estimate total accruals; and (iii) using the original Jones 
model. Unreported results show that none of the main conclusions of the paper qualitatively change when 
different accrual models are used. 
3 Roychowdhury (2006) also develops measures for sales and production manipulation. As noted by 
Roychowdhury (2006), sales and production manipulation would negatively affect abnormal cash flow, while a 
cut in discretionary expense to inflate earnings would lead to higher abnormal cash flow. The opposing effects 
make it difficult to interpret the results, especially if the three measures are employed together. In addition, 
production manipulation is only available to manufacturing firms. During our sample period, Rhodes (2005) 
reports that manufacturing firms contribute only 14% of the UK’s Gross Value Added in 1997, and the 
contribution declines consistently to reach 9.9% in 2012. Therefore, constraining the sample to only 
manufacturing firms would impair the implications of the paper for non-manufacturing firms, which play a more 
important role in the UK. For these reasons, we do not examine sales and production manipulation in this paper. 
4 See the Appendix for further details. 
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in Datastream are pooled together and the following regression is estimated for each industry-year with 
at least 6 observations: 
𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+ + 𝜶𝜶𝟑𝟑𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰(<0)𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+ + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 (1) 
where mi,t is the log of the market value of firm i at the end of fiscal year t; bi,t is the log of the book 
value of firm i in year t; nii,t+  is the log of the absolute value of the net income of firm i in year t; I(<0) is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if net income is negative and zero otherwise.  
The intrinsic value of a firm, denoted by 𝑣𝑣�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡;𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�, where 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the fundamentals of 
firm i in year t, and 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 are contemporaneous valuation multiples of industry j in year t, is calculated as 
the predicted value of equation (1) using the estimated coefficients from the corresponding industry-
year regression, as follows: 
𝒗𝒗�𝜽𝜽𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕;𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕� =  𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶�𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+ + 𝜶𝜶�𝟑𝟑𝟎𝟎,𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰(<0)𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕+    (2) 
We calculate the means of 𝛼𝛼�0, 𝛼𝛼�1, 𝛼𝛼�2 and 𝛼𝛼�3 across industry-years and the t-statistics using the 
standard errors of the means. The untabulated results show that the means of 𝛼𝛼�0, 𝛼𝛼�1, 𝛼𝛼�2 and 𝛼𝛼�3 across 
industry-years are 1.54, 0.59, 0.40 and -0.05, respectively, and they are all significant at the 1% level. 
All the signs, magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients are comparable to those reported 
by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). The adjusted R2 is 88%, which is again comparable to that reported in 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). The unreported results also show that on an industry-by-industry basis, 
there are no significantly large or small coefficient values which could potentially bias the means as 
reported. Because equation (2) gives intrinsic values in log form, we convert those intrinsic values into 
sterling value and denote them as FIV. To measure market mispricing, we use the price-to-value ratio, 
denoted as FVE, which is calculated as the market value of equity divided by FIV. 
SOV and ROV firms are then identified as follows. For each industry-year, all firms are ranked 
into five quintiles based on their FVE. The top quintile, which includes the firms that are most 
overvalued, contains both SOV and ROV firms. We then create FSOV as the indicator of SOV firms 
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within this top quintile of firms sorted by FEV and define FSOV as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm’s FVE is higher than or equal to the 95th percentile of the corresponding industry-
year, and zero otherwise. The indicator of ROV firms, denoted as FROV, is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if a firm belongs to the top quintile sorted by FVE but is not an SOV firm (i.e., those 
firms with an FVE higher than or equal to the 80th percentile but smaller than the 95th percentile), and 
zero otherwise.5  
3.4.     Control variables 
(i) Size, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage and operating cash flows 
Firms of different sizes face different costs and incentives to manipulate earnings (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Earnings management 
could also be dependent on the levels of growth opportunities (Roychowdhury, 2005; Chi and Gupta, 
2009) and profitability (Dechow et al., 1995). Moreover, debts usually come with restrictions, which in 
turn are often tied to the firm’s performance. For example, Houmes and Skantz (2010) have shown that 
earnings management is related to financial leverage. In addition, Dechow et al. (1995) found that 
discretionary accruals are negatively related to operating cash flows. Indeed, most of the previous 
studies on earnings management control for size, growth opportunities, profitability, financial leverage 
and operating cash flows (Becker et al., 1998, Roychowdhury, 2006, Badertscher, 2011, Zang, 2012).  
We follow the extant literature and control for these factors. Industry-adjusted firm size, denoted 
as aSIZE, is used to control for size and is calculated as the deviation of the log of the market value of 
equity at fiscal year-end from the corresponding industry-year median. Henceforth, we use an italic ‘a’ 
prefix to name variables that are industry-adjusted by subtracting the corresponding industry-year 
median as described above. Growth opportunities are proxied by the value-to-book ratio, VB, measured 
as FIV divided by the book value of equity. To proxy for profitability, the industry-adjusted return-on-
assets ratio, aROA, is used, where ROA is calculated as the net income available to common 
5 We acknowledge that our approach to identify SOV and ROV firms is somewhat arbitrary. Please see section 
4.4. for a robustness test to mitigate this concern. 
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shareholders scaled by initial total assets. We control for leverage using aLEV, where LEV is the ratio 
of total debts to total assets. Since there is no consistent evidence in the literature regarding the sign of 
these factors, we make no predictions on the sign. Finally, aCFO is introduced to control for the well-
documented negative relationship between discretionary accruals and operating cash flows, where CFO 
is the ratio of operating cash flows to sales. aCFO is only used in the AEM regression and is predicted 
to have a negative sign. 
(ii) Past use of AEM 
Because of the reversing nature of accruals, use of AEM in the past may constrain a firm from 
further engaging in AEM. In the literature, net operating assets are often used as a measure of a firm’s 
past AEM activity and it has been shown that firms with high net operating assets are less likely to 
further engage in AEM (Barton and Simko, 2002). We use aBLOAT to control for a firm’s past use of 
AEM and include it in both the AEM and REM regressions, where BLOAT is measured as 
shareholders’ equity plus total debts minus cash and short-term investment scaled by sales. Because 
higher net operating assets constrain AEM, which in turn implies more REM activity since AEM and 
REM can be used as substitutes (Zang, 2012), aBLOAT is expected to have a negative sign in the AEM 
regression and a positive sign in the REM regression. 
(iii) Competition 
Deviations from optimal business decisions do not come without costs, and these costs vary 
depending on the industry and on how competitive a firm is within its industry. Firms in less 
competitive industries and firms that are relatively more competitive face lower costs of REM activity. 
We use the Herfindahl index, denoted as HERFINDAHL, to proxy for the level of competition in the 
industry. Each year, HERFINDAHL is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in 
the industry, where the market share of a firm is its sales scaled by the total sales of all firms in the 
industry. Moreover, to proxy for the firm industry-relative competitiveness, M_SHARE is calculated as 
the percentage of a firm’s sales to the total sales of its industry (Zang, 2012). Because low industry-level 
competitiveness and high firm-specific relative competitiveness could decrease the cost of REM, both 
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HERFINDAHL and M_SHARE are expected to be positive in the REM regression. Neither 
HERFINDAHL nor M_SHARE are used in the AEM regression. 
(iv) Financial distress 
Firms in financial distress face more pressure to manage earnings. García Lara et al. (2009) find 
that failed firms engage in both AEM and REM in the years leading to the failure. Zang (2012) argues 
that it is costlier for financially distressed firms to engage in REM and finds that firms would employ 
more AEM than REM in response to financial distress. Badertscher (2011) also finds that less distressed 
firms use more REM. Thus, we also control for financial distress. We follow García Lara et al. (2009) to 
estimate the probability of failure using the bankruptcy prediction model designed for the UK market by 
Charitou et al. (2004):  
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 = 𝟏𝟏(𝟏𝟏+𝒆𝒆−𝒛𝒛)         (3a) 
and: −𝒁𝒁 = −𝟕𝟕.𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + 𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐.𝟑𝟑𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟏𝟏𝒙𝒙𝟏𝟏 − 𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎.𝟗𝟗𝟏𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟏𝟏𝒙𝒙𝟐𝟐 − 𝟑𝟑.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕𝟎𝟎𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑   (3b) 
where POF is the probability of failure; 𝑥𝑥1 is total liabilities divided by total assets; 𝑥𝑥2 is earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total liabilities; 𝑥𝑥3 is cash flows from operations divided by total 
liabilities. 
 Based on the method used in Zang (2012), we include POF in both AEM and REM regressions 
to control for financial distress. A higher POF value implies more financial distress, which increases the 
cost of engaging in REM and encourages managers to use AEM as a substitute. Following this line of 
argument, we predict POF to be negatively correlated with abnormal discretionary expenses but 
positively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
(v) Big bath practice 
The big bath practice refers to extreme earnings management behaviour where managers 
intentionally book large losses into the current period, possibly to boost future earnings. It is well 
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documented that firms tend to register large write-offs in periods when the managers find it difficult to 
avoid a loss (Christensen et al., 2008). We account for this practice by introducing two control variables. 
The first variable, LOSS_FIRM, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s net income 
is negative, and zero otherwise. The second variable, LOSS_IND, is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the average net income of all firms in an industry is negative, and zero otherwise. 
LOSS_FIRM and LOSS_IND are expected to have negative signs in both the AEM and REM 
regressions.  
(vi) External auditors  
External auditors, whose aim is to assure the true and fair view of financial statements, play an 
important role in constraining AEM. Existing evidence suggests that AEM is lower in firms audited by 
Big 4 auditors6 (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). Given that AEM and REM are used as 
substitutes, if a Big-4 auditor constrains a firm from using AEM, the firm would be more likely to resort 
to REM, which involves business judgement over the discretion of managers but gives auditors less 
power of interference. We, therefore, control for the quality of external auditors by introducing a 
dummy variable, BIG4, which takes the value of one if a firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors, 
and zero otherwise. Since the presence of a Big-4 auditor would constrain AEM and divert the firms 
towards using REM as a substitute, we predict BIG4 to have a negative sign in the AEM regression and 
positive sign in the REM regression. 
3.5. The baseline regressions 
Zang (2012) argues that managers use REM before fiscal year-end. In this way, they are able to 
see if the desired earnings have been achieved before adjusting the level of AEM accordingly. We 
follow Zang (2012) and estimate the AEM and REM regressions jointly using a recursive equation 
6 Depending on the time period, we could refer to the Big 5 or 6 audit firms. Hereafter, in the interest of brevity, 
we will refer to the Big 4. 
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system to capture this sequence of decisions with the expected and unexpected components of REM 
added into the AEM regression: 
𝑨𝑨𝒃𝒃_𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑰𝒁𝒁𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎�𝑭𝑭𝑽𝑽𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� +
𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕�𝒂𝒂𝑽𝑽𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑰𝑰𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟗𝟗�𝑴𝑴_𝑭𝑭𝑯𝑯𝑨𝑨𝑭𝑭𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎�𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑷𝑷𝑰𝑰𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑰𝑰𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑�𝑽𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑩𝑩𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 (4) 
𝑨𝑨𝒃𝒃_𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑰𝒁𝒁𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎�𝑭𝑭𝑽𝑽𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� +
𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕�𝒂𝒂𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑽𝑽𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟗𝟗�𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑷𝑷𝑰𝑰𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑰𝑰𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐�𝑽𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑩𝑩𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑�𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑽𝑽𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐�𝑼𝑼𝑨𝑨𝑽𝑽𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 (5) 
where PABDEX is the predicted value of equation (4); UABDEX is the residual of equation (4); and all 
other variables are described in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 
The above regressions allow a comparison of the levels of REM and AEM of SOV and ROV 
firms versus the rest of the sample. Given the concerns regarding using panel data (e.g., Thompson, 
2009; Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010), two-way clustered standard errors that are robust across both 
time and firm dimensions are used. The coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2. H1 predicts that 𝛽𝛽1 is 
significantly positive, while H2 predicts that 𝛽𝛽2 is insignificant in both equations (4) and (5). 
4. Descriptive statistics and empirical results 
4.1.    Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The median price-to-value ratio, 
FVE, which we use as a proxy for market mispricing, is 0.9736, showing that approximately half of the 
sample firms are overvalued, and the other half are undervalued. The averages of Ab_AC and Ab_DEX 
are small, but not zero, because of the winsorization. All of the industry-adjusted variables (i.e., aSIZE, 
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aROA, aLEV, aCFO, aBLOAT) have a median of zero, as expected due to the way they are 
constructed. Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest no serious concerns and are comparable to other 
studies (Garcia Lara et al., 2009; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Athanasakou et al., 2011).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the main variables. FVE is 
negatively and significantly related to Ab_DEX (-0.121), while the correlation between FVE and 
Ab_AC is insignificant at the 5% level, although it is negative (-0.009). Among the control variables, 
most of the expected correlations with the proxies for earnings management are observed, but there is 
no significant correlation between the explanatory variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
4.2. Univariate analysis 
We first examine the characteristics of firms with different degrees of market mispricing. Within 
each industry-year, firms are sorted by FVE at the end of year t – 1 into five quintiles, namely, Groups 1 
to 5. Within the top quintile, Group 5, firms are further divided into four smaller groups. Groups 6, 7 
and 8 include ROV firms, which are firms that respectively have an FVE larger than or equal to the 
corresponding industry-year 80th percentile, but smaller than the 85th percentile (Group 6); are larger 
than or equal to the corresponding industry-year 85th percentile, but smaller than the 90th percentile 
(Group 7); and are larger than or equal to the corresponding industry-year 90th percentile, but smaller 
than the 95th percentile (Group 8). Group 9 includes SOV firms, which are those that have an FVE 
larger than or equal to the corresponding industry-year 95th percentile. Table 3 reports the means of the 
earnings management proxies, market mispricing and some selected fundamentals for each group, 
together with the results of the t-tests comparing the means between: (i) ROV firms and the rest of the 
sample; (ii) SOV firms and the rest of the sample; and (iii) SOV and ROV firms. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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The classification scheme we use results in 1,701 observations being classified as ROV firms and 
634 observations as SOV firms. The evidence in Table 3 suggests that overvalued firms, both SOV and 
ROV, are significantly larger in size, measured by sales, total assets and market value of equity, than the 
rest of the sample. However, there is no evidence that SOV firms are larger than ROV firms as the 
differences in sales, total assets and market value of equity are all statistically insignificant. The FVE of 
SOV firms is higher than that of ROV firms by 1.1785 (significant at 1% level). Across the five 
quintiles sorted by FVE (i.e., Group 1 to Group 5), there is no clear pattern in the use of AEM and 
REM. Focussing on the top quintile, that is the overvalued firms in Group 5, the means of Ab_AC and 
Ab_DEX are positive (0.0145 and 0.0195, respectively), suggesting a positive association between 
income-increasing earnings management and overvaluation in line with the existing literature (Chi and 
Gupta, 2009; Houmes and Skantz, 2010; Badertscher, 2011). When the top quintile is decomposed into 
FSOV and FROV, the mean Ab_AC of SOV firms is significantly higher compared to that of either 
ROV firms (the difference is 0.0322, significant at the 1% level) or the rest of the sample (the difference 
is 0.0372, significant at 1% level). Similarly, the mean Ab_DEX of SOV firms is significantly higher 
than that of either ROV firms (the difference is 0.1184, significant at the 1% level) or the rest of the 
sample (the difference is 0.0704, significant at the 1% level). This initial evidence suggests that SOV 
firms inflate earnings using both AEM and REM. In contrast, the mean Ab_AC of ROV firms is not 
significantly higher than the rest of the sample (the difference is 0.005 and is statistically insignificant) 
and ROV firms exhibit lower Ab_DEX than the rest of the sample (the difference is -0.0479, significant 
at 1% level). This evidence suggests that ROV firms do not inflate earnings. 
Overall, the initial evidence presented in this section supports the hypothesis that SOV firms 
inflate earnings using both AEM and REM, while ROV firms do not engage in income-increasing 
earnings management. In the next section, we build on these findings by further considering other 
known drivers of earnings management within a multivariate regression framework. 
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4.3. Regression Analysis 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equations (4) and (5). Focusing first on the key variables 
of interest, FSOV and FROV, the coefficient of Ab_AC on FSOV is positive and statistically significant 
(0.0407, significant at the 1% level), suggesting that SOV firms inflate earnings using AEM. Similarly, 
the coefficient of Ab_DEX on FSOV is significantly positive (0.0575, significant at the 1% level). 
These results suggest that SOV firms make use of both AEM and REM to inflate earnings to justify the 
high market valuation. When Ab_AC is the dependent variable, the coefficient of FROV is -0.0103 and 
is statistically insignificant. The coefficient of Ab_DEX on FROV is negative (-0.0503) and significant 
at the 1% level. These results, taken together with the significantly positive coefficients of Ab_AC and 
Ab_DEX on FSOV, suggest that the evidence in the extant literature of income-increasing earnings 
management by overvalued firms (Chi and Gupta, 2009; Houmes and Skantz, 2010; Badertscher, 2011) 
is mainly driven by SOV firms. In contrast, ROV firms, although overvalued by the market, refrain from 
inflating earnings. These findings support both hypotheses H1 and H2. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Further consideration of the results in Table 4 show that VB, which captures growth 
opportunities, is negatively related to Ab_DEX (-0.0081, significant at the 1% level), suggesting that 
firms with more growth opportunities tend to have higher discretionary expenditure. The coefficient of 
Ab_AC on aCFO is negative (-0.007) and statistically significant (1% level), as predicted. aBLOAT 
exhibits a negative relation with Ab_AC (-0.0024, significant at the 10% level), which implies that the 
past use of accruals does play a significant role in constraining further engagement in AEM. aBLOAT is 
also positively related to Ab_DEX (0.0021, significant at the 1% level), suggesting that managers tend 
to switch to REM when further use of AEM could be detected. The coefficient on BIG4 is significantly 
negative in the Ab_AC regression (-0.007, significant at the 5% level), which shows that the Big-4 audit 
firms constrain the use of AEM. The coefficient of Ab_AC on UABDEX is significantly negative (-
0.0127, significant at the 1% level) supporting the existing evidence that a firm would decide the level 
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of AEM after observing the realized effect of REM on reported earnings (Zang, 2012). In general, most 
of the coefficients of the control variables are consistent with earlier predictions7. 
While the evidence supports both hypotheses H1 and H2, the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of Ab_DEX on FROV needs further investigation. We believe that the abnormally high 
discretionary expenses exhibited by ROV firms are more the result of changing real operation activities 
in accordance with the business life cycle than a deliberate attempt to depress earnings. In the expanding 
phase of their firms’ life cycle, managers are motivated to invest to take advantage of the available 
growth opportunities and deter entry from potential competitors (Dickinson, 2011). Being overvalued in 
this stage has important implications. We argue that managers of SOV firms in the expanding phase are 
reluctant to invest more if such investments lead to lower reported earnings (such as research and 
development or other discretionary expenses), because this would trigger large price corrections. 
However, if a firm is only relatively overvalued in the expanding phase, managers are willing to spend 
on investments that could enhance future value, even if it means lower reported earnings. Hence, high 
abnormal discretionary expenses of ROV firms in the expanding period are not interpreted as a 
deliberate attempt to manage earnings, but rather as a decision justified by the currently experienced 
business life cycle. 
To test for the above inferred behaviour, we introduce CYCLE as a variable that captures the 
firm-level business life cycle. CYCLE is constructed as follows. First, in each industry-year, we sort all 
firms into three terciles using sales growth (defined as the arithmetic growth of net sales compared to 
last year) and create a variable named SG_CYCLE, which is assigned values of 1, 2 or 3 if a firm 
belongs to the top, middle or bottom tercile, respectively. The process is repeated to obtain 
CAPEX_CYCLE, which is assigned a value of 1, 2 or 3 if a firm belongs to the top, middle or bottom 
7 Since there are many control variables, an immediate concern is multicollinearity. Table 2 shows that there is no 
considerable correlation between the explanatory variables. We also calculate the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
for all the predictors in equations (3) and (4). The unreported results show that none of the VIFs is above 3.92, 
except for the VIF for PABDEX (13.07) in equation (4), mostly due to its high correlation with aROA (Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 0.792, significant at the 1% level). To mitigate the concern, we re-estimate equation (4) 
without aROA on the right-hand side, and the main results do not qualitatively change (the VIF for PABDEX drops 
to 2.46). As a last check, equations (3) and (4) are re-estimated using only aSIZE, VB and aROA as control variables. 
The unreported results show that when using this specification, the main conclusions are qualitatively the same.  
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tercile sorted by capital expenditures, respectively; DIV_CYCLE, which is assigned a value of 1, 2 or 3 
if a firm belongs to the bottom, middle or top tercile sorted by cash dividends, respectively; and 
AGE_CYCLE, which is assigned a value of 1, 2 or 3 if a firm belongs to the bottom, middle or top 
tercile sorted by firm age, respectively. CYCLE is then calculated as the sum of SG_CYCLE, 
CAPEX_CYCLE, DIV_CYCLE and AGE_CYCLE. The existing literature shows that firms in the 
expanding (mature/stagnant) phase generally have high (low) sales growth and capital expenditures and 
low (high) cash dividends and age (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; Dickinson, 2011). By construction, 
CYCLE is an integer ranging from 4 to 12, and lower (higher) values suggest that firms are in the 
expanding (mature/stagnant) phase of their life cycle.  
Dickinson (2011) argues and provides evidence that most firms on the market would be mature 
firms, because expanding firms eventually become mature, and once they reach the mature phase, their 
managers aim at maintaining stability to defer entering the stagnant phase. Following this line of 
argument, we arbitrarily define firms with a CYCLE of 7 or lower as expanding firms. Therefore, 2,936 
observations, equivalent to 24.8% of the sample, are classified as expanding firms, and 8,915 
observations, 75.2% of the sample, as mature firms, which is comparable to previous studies using 
different classification schemes (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; Dickinson, 2011). We define EXPAND as 
a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if CYCLE is 7 or smaller, and zero otherwise. Using a 
similar approach to the main test, the following regressions are then estimated jointly using a recursive 
equation system as follows: 
𝑨𝑨𝒃𝒃_𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑�𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 ×
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 × 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑰𝒁𝒁𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕�𝑭𝑭𝑽𝑽𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟗𝟗�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎�𝒂𝒂𝑽𝑽𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑰𝑰𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐�𝑴𝑴_𝑭𝑭𝑯𝑯𝑨𝑨𝑭𝑭𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑�𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑷𝑷𝑰𝑰𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟓𝟓�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑰𝑰𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�𝑽𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑩𝑩𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 (6) 
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𝑨𝑨𝒃𝒃_𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑�𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 ×
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓�𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 × 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑰𝒁𝒁𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕�𝑭𝑭𝑽𝑽𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟗𝟗�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝑫𝑫𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎�𝒂𝒂𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�𝒂𝒂𝑽𝑽𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐�𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑷𝑷𝑰𝑰𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎�𝒂𝒂𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭_𝑰𝑰𝑯𝑯𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟓𝟓�𝑽𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑩𝑩𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏�𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑨𝑽𝑽𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� +
𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕�𝑼𝑼𝑨𝑨𝑽𝑽𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕� + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 (7) 
Due to the lack of an underlying economic theory that links accruals behaviour with the business 
life cycle (Owens et al., 2017), we make no prediction about how SOV and ROV firms engage in AEM 
in the expanding phase. Equation (7) is estimated and the results are reported for completeness. The 
main focus, however, is on equation (6), where we test if being overvalued in the expanding phase 
would make a difference to the firms’ discretionary expenses. 𝛽𝛽1 (𝛽𝛽2) in equation (6) captures the effect 
of being substantially overvalued (relatively overvalued) in the post-expanding phases on discretionary 
expenditure. If SOV (ROV) firms deviate from normal levels of discretionary expenses in the expanding 
phase, the effect is captured by 𝛽𝛽4 (𝛽𝛽5). The results are reported in Table 5. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Including the business life cycle in the analysis reveals some interesting insights. EXPAND is 
significantly negative in the Ab_DEX regression (-0.0325 significant at the 1% level), suggesting that 
firms in the expanding phase tend to report higher discretionary expenses, most likely to take advantage 
of available growth opportunities. However, SOV firms in the expanding phase do not report higher 
discretionary expenses, as the coefficient of Ab_DEX on the interaction term FSOV*EXPAND is 
statistically insignificant. In contrast, ROV firms in the expanding phase report significantly higher 
discretionary expenses than normal, as the FROV*EXPAND term exhibits a significant and negative 
relationship with Ab_DEX (-0.1449 significant at the 1% level). After controlling for the abnormally 
high discretionary expenses of ROV firms in the expanding phase, there is no evidence that ROV firms 
in the post-expanding phase, which accounts for 75.2% of the sample, exhibit any deviation from 
normal levels of discretionary expenses, as the coefficient of Ab_DEX on FROV is statistically 
insignificant. The evidence suggests that ROV firms report high levels of Ab_DEX. This finding is 
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mainly driven by the behaviour of firms in the expanding phase, rather than resulting from a deliberate 
attempt by managers to increase discretionary expenses to deflate earnings.  
4.4.     Robustness tests 
(i)      Alternative model to estimate market mispricing  
In the main test, which follows Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), a firm’s intrinsic value is estimated 
using a special form of the residual income valuation model, under the assumptions that book values 
and net incomes grow at constant rates, where the growth rates and costs of equity are embodied by the 
risk characteristics of the average firm in each industry-year. This approach is also used by Chi and 
Gupta (2009) in a related study that examines how managers of overvalued firms manage earnings. 
Badertscher (2011) also employs this approach in a robustness test. However, in the main test, 
Badertscher (2011) follows Frankel and Lee (1998) to estimate the firms’ intrinsic value using a 
valuation model based on the residual income approach (Edwards and Bell, 1966; Ohlson, 1995). To see 
if our results hold if we adopt the valuation model in Badertscher (2011), we employ a version of the 
residual income approach, as proposed by Frankel and Lee (1998). In particular, we estimate the firm’s 
intrinsic value as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )(1+𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ) × 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )(1+𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )×𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 × 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the intrinsic value of firm i at the end of year t; 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are the book value of 
equity and the future return on equity of firm i at the end of year t derived from Bloomberg’s BEst 
consensus, using the sequential process as outlined in Frankel and Lee (1998); 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  is the cost of equity 
of firm i in year t, estimated using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model augmented by the 
momentum factor (Carhart, 1997)8. 
8 The data used to estimate the four-factor model, including the risk-free rate, returns on the market portfolio, 
size, book-to-market and momentum factors are sourced from the database made available by Gregory et al. 
(2013). 
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The BEst consensus forecast is downloaded from Bloomberg and merged to the main database 
via ISIN. For this robustness test, we keep only firm-year observations that have sufficient data to 
estimate intrinsic value using equation (8) above. As a result, the sample used in this robustness test is 
significantly smaller than the sample in the main test and contains only 1,684 observations. The price-
to-value ratio, denoted RVE, is calculated as the market value divided by RIV. Based on REV, we 
define RSOV and RROV firms as substantially overvalued and relatively overvalued firms, 
respectively, using the same method as was used for the main test. Finally, equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) 
are re-estimated using RSOV and RROV instead of FSOV and FROV, respectively. The results 
presented in Table 6 suggest that the use of an alternative way to estimate market mispricing does not 
qualitatively change the results.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
(ii)      Alternative benchmark to identify overvalued firms  
We acknowledge that the use of the 80th and 95th percentiles to define SOV and ROV firms in the 
main test, although necessary for this type of research, is arbitrary. To mitigate concerns that our results 
could be affected by such arbitrary benchmarks, we replicate the main test using the 67th and 90th 
percentiles. In particular, using the same methods of the main test, ROV firms are defined in this section 
as those with FVE larger than or equal to the 67th percentile but smaller than the 90th percentile and 
SOV firms are those with FVE larger than or equal to the 90th percentile. Under these definitions, more 
firms are identified as overvalued. The results, reported in Table 7, show that the use of lower 
benchmarks to identify SOV and ROV firms does not change the main conclusion of our paper. 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
5. Conclusions 
While the existing literature suggests that overvaluation can trigger earnings management (Chi 
and Gupta, 2009; Houmes and Skantz, 2010; Badertscher, 2011), we additionally show that the degree 
of such overvaluation is important. By making a distinction between substantially overvalued firms 
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(SOV) and relatively overvalued firms (ROV), we reveal some new insights. Using a sample of UK 
listed stocks for the period from 1995 to 2012, we hypothesize and find evidence that, in line with 
Jensen’s (2005) conjecture, managers of SOV firms inflate earnings to sustain the substantial 
overvaluation. The evidence suggests that managers of SOV firms employ both income-increasing 
accruals-based and real earnings management. Second, we hypothesize that managers of ROV firms 
refrain from managing earnings since it would be too costly to support market expectations through 
earnings management. The findings confirm that managers of ROV firms do not engage in AEM. We 
further observe that ROV firms exhibit abnormally high discretionary expenses, but this result is driven 
by ROV firms in the expanding phase of their life cycle. This suggests that managers of ROV firms only 
increase discretionary expenses in response to the needs and pressures of expanding, rather than in a 
deliberate attempt to deflate earnings. Thus, the evidence suggests that ROV firms do not inflate 
earnings to sustain high market valuation.  
Overall, the findings further clarify our understanding of capital market driven motivations for 
earnings management. The results presented in the paper have a number of important implications for 
investors who target mispriced stocks and for company boards and audit committees in supervising the 
firm’s real operations. 
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
Ab_AC is discretionary accruals, measured as the deviation of actual scaled TAC from the predicted 
value of the following equation, which is estimated within each (two-digit SIC code) industry-year with 
at least 6 observations of available data, using a sample that comprises only ordinary stocks of UK firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange with one type of ordinary share and a positive book value of equity, 
excluding financial and utilities firms: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ + 𝛽𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 
𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; where TAC is total accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary 
income and after preferred dividend minus cash flow from operations (from the cash flows statements); 
PPE is gross plant, property and equipment; ∆REC is change in receivables from last fiscal year; TA is 
total assets. 
Ab_DEX is abnormal discretionary expense, measured as the deviation of actual scaled DEX from the 
predicted value of the following equation, which is estimated within each (two-digit SIC code) industry-
year with at least 6 observations of available data using a sample that comprises only ordinary stocks of 
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange with one type of ordinary share and a positive book value 
of equity, excluding financial and utilities firms, multiplied by -1: 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ +
𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; where DEX is the discretionary expense, defined as the sum of research and 
development and selling and general administrative expenses. 
27 
 
FIV, or 𝐯𝐯�𝛉𝛉𝐢𝐢,𝐭𝐭;𝛂𝛂𝐣𝐣,𝐭𝐭�, is firm-specific intrinsic value, estimated using a firm’s fundamentals (θi,t) and the 
contemporaneous industry valuation multiples (α�j,t), defined as: 𝑣𝑣�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡;𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼�0𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼�1𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛼𝛼�2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ + 𝛼𝛼�3𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅(<0)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ ; in which α�kj,t (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) are from estimating the following regression 
within each (two-digit SIC code) industry-year with at least 6 observations of available data using a 
sample that comprises only ordinary stocks of UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange with one 
type of ordinary share and a positive book value of equity, excluding financial and utilities firms: 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝛼𝛼0𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ + 𝛼𝛼3𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅(<0)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ + 𝛼𝛼4𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; where m is log of market value of 
equity at fiscal year-end, b is log of book value of equity; ni+ is log of the absolute value of net income; 
I(<0) is an indicator of loss, which is one if a firm’s net income is negative and zero otherwise; LEV is 
book leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets. 
FVE is price-to-value ratio, estimated as market value divided by FIV. 
FSOV is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s FVE is higher than or equal to the corresponding 
industry-year 95th percentile. 
FROV is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s FVE is higher than or equal to the corresponding 
industry-year 80th percentile but smaller than the 95th percentile. 
aSIZE is the deviation from the corresponding industry-year median of the log of market value at fiscal 
year-end.  
VB is the value-to-book ratio, defined as firm-specific intrinsic values divided by book values of equity.  
aROA is the deviation from the corresponding industry-year median of ROA (the ratio of net incomes to 
beginning total assets).  
aLEV is the deviation from the corresponding industry-year median of LEV (the ratio of total debts to 
total assets).  
aCFO is the deviation from the corresponding industry-year median of CFO (the ratio of operating cash 
flows to sales). 
aBLOAT is the deviation from the corresponding industry-year median of BLOAT, where BLOAT is 
shareholder’s equity plus total debts minus cash and short-term investment scaled by sales.  
M_SHARE is the percentage of a firm’s sales to the total sales of its industry.  
HERFINDAHL is the sum of squared market share of all firms in an industry, where the market share of 
a firm is its sales scaled by the total sales of its industry.  
𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏 = 1(1+𝑒𝑒−𝑧𝑧), where −𝑍𝑍 = −7.1786 + 12.3826𝑥𝑥1 − 20.9691𝑥𝑥2 − 3.0174𝑥𝑥3, in which: 𝑥𝑥1 is total 
liabilities divided by total assets; 𝑥𝑥2 is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total liabilities; 𝑥𝑥3 is 
cash flows from operations divided by total liabilities. 
LOSS_FIRM is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s net income is negative, and zero otherwise.  
LOSS_IND is a dummy variable, which is one if the average net income of all firms in an industry is 
negative, and zero otherwise.  
BIG4 is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. 
SG_CYCLE is 1 (2 or 3) if a firm belongs to the top (middle or bottom, respectively) tercile sorted by 
sales growth within each industry-year, where sales growth is defined as the arithmetic growth of net sales 
compared to last year. 
CAPEX_CYCLE is 1 (2 or 3) if a firm belongs to the top (middle or bottom, respectively) tercile sorted 
by capital expenditures within each industry-year. 
DIV_CYCLE is 1 (2 or 3) if a firm belongs to the bottom (middle or top, respectively) tercile sorted by 
cash dividends within each industry-year. 
AGE_CYCLE is 1 (2 or 3) if a firm belongs to the bottom (middle or top, respectively) tercile sorted by 
firm age within each industry-year. 
CYCLE is the sum of SG_CYCLE, CAPEX_CYCLE, DIV_CYCLE and AGE_CYCLE. 
EXPAND is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if CYCLE is 7 or smaller, zero otherwise. 
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RIV is the residual income valuation model’s intrinsic values, measured as 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )(1+𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ) ×
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )(1+𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 )×𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 × 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, where B and FROE are the book value of equity and future return on equity 
derived from Bloomberg’s BEst consensus using the sequential process as outlined in Frankel and Lee 
(1998); re is the cost of equity, estimated using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model augmented 
by the momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). 
RVE is the price-to-value ratio, estimated as the market value divided by RIV. 
RSOV is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s RVE is higher than or equal to the corresponding 
industry-year 95th percentile. 
RROV is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s RVE is higher than or equal to the corresponding 
industry-year 80th percentile but smaller than the 95th percentile. 
LSOV is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s FVE is higher than or equal to the corresponding 
industry-year 90th percentile. 
LROV is a dummy variable, which is one if a firm’s FVE is higher than or equal to the corresponding 
industry-year 67th percentile but smaller than the 90th percentile. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
Standard 
deviation 
Ab_ACt 0.0035 -0.0459 0.0076 0.0605 0.1207 
Ab_DEXt 0.0321 -0.0719 0.0413 0.1662 0.2629 
FVEt-1 1.2001 0.6396 0.9736 1.4447 0.8976 
aSIZEt-1 0.1248 -1.0927 0.0000 1.1982 1.7861 
VBt-1 2.5170 1.2880 1.9646 2.9535 2.1159 
aROAt -0.0367 -0.0631 0.0000 0.0487 0.1910 
aLEVt-1 0.0258 -0.0640 0.0000 0.1027 0.1361 
aCFOt -0.4565 -0.0537 0.0000 0.0568 2.7076 
aBLOATt-1 1.0731 -0.1771 0.0000 0.3209 5.9533 
HERFINDAHLt 0.2705 0.1318 0.2232 0.3684 0.1941 
M_SHAREt 0.0611 0.0027 0.0115 0.0495 0.1278 
POFt 0.3561 0.1402 0.2361 0.8993 0.4181 
LOSS_FIRMt 0.3232 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4677 
LOSS_INDt 0.1648 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3710 
BIG4t 0.5482 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4977 
Notes: The table reports basic descriptive statistics of selected variables for the final sample (n = 11,851 
observations). Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Correlations 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Ab_ACt (1)              
Ab_DEXt (2) 0.045             
FVEt-1 (3) -0.009 -0.121            
aSIZEt-1 (4) -0.003 0.042 0.218           
VBtm1 (5) 0.055 -0.072 0.173 0.036          
aROAt (6) 0.381 0.204 -0.005 0.235 -0.039         
aLEVt-1 (7) -0.004 0.092 -0.008 0.107 0.067 0.038        
aCFOt (8) -0.010 0.069 -0.042 0.075 -0.074 0.331 0.072       
aBLOATt-1 (9) -0.035 0.014 -0.001 -0.064 -0.035 -0.175 -0.014 -0.487      
HERFINDAHLt (10) -0.008 -0.012 0.009 0.045 0.012 -0.030 -0.007 -0.051 0.034     
M_SHAREt (11) -0.010 0.048 0.060 0.545 0.025 0.147 0.137 0.089 -0.082 0.183    
POFt (12) 0.070 -0.084 -0.078 0.247 -0.082 0.454 -0.159 0.269 -0.194 -0.076 0.090   
LOSS_FIRMt (13) -0.247 -0.097 0.074 -0.235 0.005 -0.631 0.006 -0.251 0.187 0.088 -0.142 -0.509  
LOSS_INDt (14) -0.007 0.007 0.023 -0.006 0.097 -0.029 0.025 -0.062 0.053 0.027 0.051 -0.155 0.218  
BIG4t (15) 0.001 -0.003 0.037 0.286 -0.023 0.097 0.082 0.037 -0.071 -0.040 0.160 0.049 -0.103 0.004 
Notes: The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between the main variables. The coefficients reported in bold are significant at the 5% level. Definitions 
of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Proxies for Earnings Management, Market Mispricing and Fundamentals Between Substantially Overvalued Firms, 
Relatively Overvalued Firms, and the Rest of the Sample 
  All sample (n = 11,851)   Within the top FVE quintile (n = 2,335)   80th-95th (ROV) 
<80th (Rest 
of sample)   
ROV minus 
Rest 
SOV minus 
Rest 
SOV minus 
ROV 
  <20th 20th-40th 40th-60th 
60th-
80th >=80th   80th-85th 85th-90th 90th-95th 
>=95th 
(SOV)   
       
Group 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 8        
n 2,396 2,368 2,385 2,367 2,335   532 631 538 634   1,701 9,516         
Ab_ACt -0.0091 0.0034 0.0031 0.0059 0.0145   0.0049 0.0033 0.0096 0.0380   0.0058 0.0008   0.005 0.0372*** 0.0322*** 
Ab_DEXt 0.0202 0.0581 0.0389 0.0240 0.0195  0.0142 -0.0100 -0.0423 0.1057  -0.0127 0.0353  -0.0479*** 0.0704*** 0.1184*** 
FVEt-1 0.9222 0.7115 0.9912 1.3738 2.4452  1.7907 2.0131 2.5874 3.3037  2.1252 0.9994  1.1258*** 2.3043*** 1.1785*** 
FIVt-1 279,710 635,178 555,805 705,332 660,265  573,594 717,320 400,043 897,026  572,019 543,233  28,786 353,793 325,007 
MVEt-1 283,334 353,821 565,864 936,419 1,310,506  1,049,775 1,345,964 914,444 1,830,089  1,116,845 534,132  582,713*** 1,295,957*** 713,244 
SALEt 312,739 433,543 582,992 791,295 792,191  680,460 938,696 553,516 942,669  736,104 529,570  206,535** 413,100** 206,565 
TAt-1 266,516 555,836 666,762 889,705 888,973  700,101 960,901 537,776 1,273,889  745,506 593,837  151,669 680,052* 528,383 
VBt-1 2.6221 2.4052 2.4111 2.5250 2.6227  2.5485 2.7950 2.7081 2.4410  2.6904 2.4911  0.1993*** -0.0501 0.2494** 
ROAt -0.0719 -0.0071 -0.0108 -0.0027 0.0041  0.0165 0.0047 -0.0365 0.0274  -0.0047 -0.0232  0.0186** 0.0507*** 0.0321*** 
LEVt-1 0.1499 0.1535 0.1533 0.1513 0.1622   0.1658 0.1595 0.1474 0.1743   0.1577 0.1520   0.0057 0.0223*** 0.0166** 
Notes: Within each industry-year, firms are sorted based on FVE. Group 1 (2, 3, 4, 5) comprises firms in the bottom (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, respectively) quintile. Group 
6 (7, 8), defined as ROV firms, comprises firms that have an FVE higher than or equal to the corresponding industry-year 80th percentile but smaller than the 
85th percentile (higher than or equal to the corresponding industry-year 85th percentile but smaller than the 90th percentile, and higher than or equal to the 
corresponding industry-year 90th percentile but smaller than the 95th percentile, respectively). Group 9, defined as SOV firms, comprises firms that have an FVE 
higher than or equal to the corresponding industry-year 95th percentile. The rest of the sample refers to firms that have an FVE smaller than the corresponding 
industry-year 80th percentile. The table reports the means of the proxies for earnings management, market mispricing and selected fundamentals for each of 
the groups. The last three columns report the t-tests comparing the mean between SOV, ROV firms and the rest of sample. *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance 
at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 4. Proxies for Earnings Management Regressed on Indicators of Substantially Overvalued and 
Relatively Overvalued Firms and Control Variables 
  Ab_DEX   Ab_AC 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
FSOVt-1 0.0575 5.46***  0.0407 3.82*** 
FROVt-1 -0.0503 -7.36***  -0.0103 -1.13 
INTERCEPT 0.0524 6.04***  0.0458 5.1*** 
aSIZEt-1 -0.0011 -0.62  -0.0059 -9.4*** 
VBt-1 -0.0081 -7.18***  0.001 0.72 
aROAt 0.3085 18.72***  0.37 7.02*** 
aLEVt-1 0.1782 10.01***  0.0292 0.92 
aCFOt    -0.007 -15.62*** 
aBLOATt-1 0.0021 5.17***  -0.0024 -1.73* 
HERFINDAHLt 0.0232 1.86*    
M_SHAREt 0.0451 2.01**  
 
 
POFt -0.0286 -7.01***  0.0164 2.35** 
LOSS_FIRMt 0.0262 3.71***  -0.0107 -2.06** 
LOSS_INDt 0.0049 0.74  -0.0018 -0.58 
BIG4t -0.0141 -0.85  -0.007 -2.22** 
PABDEXt    -0.2644 -1.55 
UABDEXt       -0.0127 -3.24*** 
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating the following regressions, jointly using a recursive equation 
system using the full sample (n = 11,851): 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽11�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (4) 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽11�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
T-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). *, **, 
*** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 5. Proxies for Earnings Management Regressed on Indicators of Substantially 
Overvalued and Relatively Overvalued Firms, Indicator of Expanding Firms and Control 
Variables 
  Ab_DEX   Ab_AC 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
FSOVt-1 0.0628 5.25***   0.0402 3.32*** 
FROVt-1 -0.0116 -1.45  -0.0083 -2.05** 
EXPANDt -0.0325 -5.24***  0.0139 2.17** 
FSOVt-1*EXPANDt -0.0194 -0.77  0.0175 1.58 
FROVt-1*EXPANDt -0.1449 -9.6***  -0.0218 -0.82 
INTERCEPT 0.0421 4.72***  0.0446 5.78*** 
aSIZEt-1 -0.0009 -0.53  -0.0053 -8.17*** 
VBt-1 -0.0076 -6.79***  0.0008 0.55 
aROAt 0.3079 18.65***  0.3918 7.19*** 
aLEVt-1 0.1695 9.54***  0.038 1.21 
aCFOt    -0.0069 -15.33*** 
aBLOATt-1 0.0021 5.27***  -0.0002 -0.57 
HERFINDAHLt 0.0211 1.7*    
M_SHAREt 0.0456 2.03**  
 
 
POFt -0.027 -6.38***  0.0172 2.46** 
LOSS_FIRMt 0.0254 3.62***  -0.0097 -1.86* 
LOSS_INDt 0.0068 1.03  -0.0002 -0.04 
BIG4t -0.0145 -0.94  -0.0081 -2.48** 
PABDEXt    -0.3257 -1.84* 
UABDEXt       -0.0117 -2.97*** 
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating the following regressions jointly using a recursive 
equation system using the full sample (n = 11,851): 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽5�𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽9�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽13�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽14�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽15�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽16�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (6) 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽5�𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽9�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽14�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽15�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽16�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽17�𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
T-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). 
*, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables 
are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 6. Proxies for Earnings Management Regressed on Indicators of Substantially Overvalued and Relatively Overvalued Firms, Indicator of 
Expanding Firms and Control Variables Where Substantially Overvalued and Relatively Overvalued Firms are Identified using the Residual 
Income Valuation Model 
  Ab_DEX   Ab_AC 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RSOVt-1 0.0594 2.03** 0.0554 1.84*   0.028 1.72* -0.0026 -0.29 
RROVt-1 -0.0305 -1.72* -0.0288 -1.57  -0.0051 -0.51 -0.0181 -3.46*** 
EXPANDt   -0.0479 -2.6***    0.0087 1.16 
RSOVt-1*EXPANDt   0.1258 1.04    0.0301 0.71 
RROVt-1*EXPANDt   -0.0242 -2.42**    0.0125 0.69 
INTERCEPT 0.1147 4.06*** 0.1285 4.49***  0.0879 3*** 0.0576 3.62*** 
aSIZEt-1 0.0079 1.85* 0.0065 1.51  -0.0018 -0.94 -0.0017 -1.4 
VBt-1 -0.002 -0.54 -0.0019 -0.51  -0.0057 -4.45*** -0.0049 -4.14*** 
aROAt -0.1741 -2.55** -0.1957 -2.84***  0.3137 6.67*** 0.3756 12.89*** 
aLEVt-1 0.2878 6.39*** 0.2808 6.24***  0.094 1.28 0.013 0.4 
aCFOt      -0.0277 -8.92*** -0.0275 -8.89*** 
aBLOATt-1 0.0159 2.36** 0.0175 2.58***  -0.0118 -2.56** -0.0065 -2.32** 
HERFINDAHLt 0.005 0.18 0.0021 0.07      
M_SHAREt -0.0523 -1.25 -0.0548 -1.31      
POFt -0.0663 -2.59*** -0.0709 -2.76***  0.0508 2.8*** 0.034 3.11*** 
LOSS_FIRMt -0.0599 -2.77*** -0.0556 -2.56**  -0.0551 -3.39*** -0.0374 -4.15*** 
LOSS_INDt -0.0195 -1 -0.02 -1.02  -0.0052 -0.63 -0.0002 -0.03 
BIG4t -0.0202 -1.48 -0.0202 -1.48  -0.0199 -3.02*** -0.0149 -3.04*** 
PABDEXt      -0.3425 -1.36 -0.0556 -0.51 
UABDEXt           -0.0396 -5.08*** -0.0395 -5.06*** 
Notes: Columns (2), (3) and (6), (7) report the results of estimating the following regressions jointly using a recursive equation system using the sub-sample, 
which keeps only firms that have enough data to estimate RIV (n = 1,684): 
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𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽9�𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (4) 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽9�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
Columns (4), (5) and (8), (9) report the results of estimating the following regressions, jointly using a recursive equation system using the sub-sample, which 
keeps only firms that have enough data to estimate RIV (n = 1,684): 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽14�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽15�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽16�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (6) 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽14�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽15�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽16�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽17�𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (7) 
T-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 7. Proxies for Earnings Management Regressed on Indicators of Substantially Overvalued and Relatively Overvalued Firms, Indicator of 
Expanding Firms and Control Variables Where Substantially Overvalued and Relatively Overvalued Firms are Identified using Lower 
Benchmarks 
  Ab_DEX   Ab_AC 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LSOVt-1 0.0643 7.39*** 0.0682 6.93***  0.0424 4.1*** 0.0397 3.43*** 
LROVt-1 -0.0219 -3.76*** 0.0109 1.62  -0.0024 -0.55 0.0014 0.44 
EXPANDt   -0.0315 -4.78***    0.0106 1.8* 
LSOVt-1*EXPANDt   -0.0106 -0.51    0.0209 2.36** 
LROVt-1*EXPANDt   -0.1246 -9.7***    -0.0188 -0.89 
INTERCEPT 0.0436 4.95*** 0.0351 3.88***  0.0420 5.82*** 0.0400 6.29*** 
aSIZEt-1 -0.0028 -1.61 -0.0028 -1.59  -0.0065 -10.15*** -0.0061 -9.28*** 
VBt-1 -0.0081 -7.23*** -0.0077 -6.88***  0.0011 0.83 0.0010 0.78 
aROAt 0.3050 18.48*** 0.3033 18.36***  0.3668 7.84*** 0.3779 7.72*** 
aLEVt-1 0.1791 10.05*** 0.1740 9.8***  0.0290 1.01 0.0333 1.13 
aCFOt      -0.0070 -15.57*** -0.0069 -15.33*** 
aBLOATt-1 0.0021 5.08*** 0.0021 5.16***  -0.0004 -1.2 -0.0003 -0.88 
HERFINDAHLt 0.0215 1.72* 0.0204 1.63      
M_SHAREt 0.0563 2.5** 0.0535 2.39**      
POFt -0.0206 -2.95*** -0.0199 -2.85***  0.0270 6.31*** 0.0261 6.03*** 
LOSS_FIRMt -0.0265 -3.76*** -0.0257 -3.66***  -0.0106 -2.19** -0.0102 -2.08** 
LOSS_INDt -0.0062 -0.94 -0.0075 -1.14  -0.0011 -0.37 -0.0001 0.02 
BIG4t -0.0138 -1.18 -0.0148 -0.99  -0.0068 -2.3** -0.0075 -2.38** 
PABDEXt      -0.2601 -1.7* -0.2899 -1.8* 
UABDEXt           -0.0135 -3.44*** -0.0127 -3.22*** 
Notes: Columns (2), (3) and (6), (7) report the results of estimating the following regressions jointly using a recursive equation system using the full sample (n 
= 11,851): 
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𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽9�𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (4) 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽10�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
Columns (4), (5) and (8), (9) report the results of estimating the following regressions jointly using a recursive equation system using the full sample (n = 11,851): 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑀𝑀_𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽14�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽15�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽16�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (6) 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽8�𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9�𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽10�𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽11�𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽13�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽14�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽15�𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +
𝛽𝛽16�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽17�𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (7) 
T-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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